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Abstract: 
 
Perversion is traditionally thought as acts that depart from traditional heterosexuality through 
object, aim or performance. This article excavates the ways in which thinking desire through 
perversion can renegotiate how we think the body and subjectivity. By actively repudiating 
dominant paradigms of sexuality it is possible to understand subjectivity as flux, perversion as 
political and the body defined by its capacity to dissipate and refigure socio-sexual limits. 
Perversion is not simply against the normal but comes to present a means by which 
subjectivity may become-otherwise according to Deleuze and Guattari. Considering woman’s 
historical definition as the ‘perverted’ version of the male (be it castrated, maternal or 
otherwise), actively engaging in becoming-perverse calls for all subjects to negotiate the 
political potentials and risks of defining sexual habituation. Occupying the non-dominant 
position does not necessarily align one with being pervert, however this article will suggest 
perversion can be used as a means by which those in othered positions, and indeed all 
subjects, can volitionally explore the position of the other. Perversion is not that which one is 
named but can be a sexual-political project one undertakes. 
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Perversion: Transgressive Sexuality and Becoming-Monster 
 
No healthy person, it appears, can fail to make some addition that 
might be called perverse to the normal sexual aim.    (Freud, 74) 
 
In this article perversion will be posited as a tactic towards transformation of ways of thinking 
sexuality and subjectivity. This article introduces traditional definitions of perversion and the 
dominant paradigms by which they are named. Perversion challenges ‘the subject’ as a 
defined and reified entity which reflects rather than creates the personal and social expression 
of self. The article foregrounds the temporal aspects of subjectivity as continually 
transforming. The work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1987) will be used to discuss 
the relationship between the temporal subject, desire and perversion – a relationship they term 
‘becoming’. The aim of reiterating subjectivity as fixed, reliable and easily defined through 
frequently binarised established subject positions such as male, female, straight, gay, black 
and white allows only for either/or options. These binaries most often reflect a dominant and 
non-dominant position. Perversion in this article will call for the reconfiguration of binarily 
defined and fixed subjectivity, so that all subjects are acknowledged as unstable and 
metamorphic. Thus any one position cannot be privileged. There are implications in 
celebrating both non-dominant subjects and subject positions, such as ‘woman’, which have 
been subject to oppression and are yet to achieve equal recognition. The burgeoning feminist 
work on becoming-monster as a potentially subversive subject position – what I have termed 
‘feminist teratology’ – is introduced in order to acknowledge the problems and powers 
implicit in utilising formerly marginalised subject positions to challenge established ideas 
regarding perversion and the desirability of the ‘normal’. The role of discourse in relation to 
teratology concludes the article, emphasises the difficulties in rethinking paradigms of being, 
becoming, and naming oneself differently without falling into established ontological 
patterns. 
 
Perversion and Becoming  
 
In its clinical definition perversion simply means any non-procreative sexual act or 
heterosexual act which mimics the procreative act. 
 
The elements of a comprehensive definition of sexual perversion should include 
sexual activity or fantasy directed towards orgasm other than genital intercourse with a 
willing partner of the opposite sex and of similar maturity, persistently recurrent, not 
merely a substitute for preferred behaviour made difficult by the immediate 
environment and contrary to the generally accepted norm of sexual behaviour in the 
community. (Scott 88)  
 
Recent definitions are more liberal, however the basic paradigm of Scott’s definition remains. 
Perversion relies, for its definition, not on what it is or includes, but what it is not. In its most 
rudimentary definition culture defines perversion as primarily whatever is not traditional 
heterosexuality. Although traditional heterosexuality is no longer primarily procreative it 
continues to mimic the reproductive act where subjectivity is defined through the reproductive 
capacity of the opposed genders performing the act, rather than exploit the infinite potentials 
of the body thought through unbound desire where the gender of the other may or may not be 
the most important aspect of thinking the act. Thus heterosexuality refers less to acts of sex 
which occur between two people of the opposite sex as to the phantasy of heterosexual 
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intercourse that is automatically presumed as inevitable if someone is ‘normal’. Perversion is 
more the perversion of presumptions of subjects conforming to established subject positions, 
genders and sexualities rather than simply a deviation from heterosexual intercourse.  
Perversion is not a repudiation or celebration of certain acts but ways of thinking such acts. 
 
Perversion is also beyond homosexuality. Traditionally studies of perversion have taken, as 
their first departure point, any desire beyond socially sanctioned forms of heterosexuality, but 
as homosexuality is increasingly accepted in both society and biology it is important to move 
beyond the binary of hetero and homo. Perversion encompasses a particular space in what 
Deleuze and Guattari call ‘becoming minoritarian’. Becoming-minoritarian “implies two 
simultaneous movements, one by which a term (the subject) is withdrawn from the majority, 
an another by which the term (the medium or agent) rises up from the minority” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 291). Perversion is the minority of normal sexuality because it exploits minority 
ways of thinking desire, not because it is necessarily different (and it may not be) to common 
sexual practice. Subject positions, particularly gender, are withdrawn from the configuration 
as the only important terms by which to define sexuality. Defining desire through the term 
‘desire’ rather than through ‘male’ and/or ‘female’ destabilises the reduction of desire to 
heterosexual or homosexual. Desire is an amorphic term and all moments of desire are 
unique, not necessarily repeatable and hence a series of minor sexualities. If we utilise 
perversion as an agent toward becoming-minoritarian we withdraw from acknowledging 
paradigms of majority as the only, compulsory or most attractive positions available. This 
withdrawal is an active withdrawal. Perversion combats the normative force of dominant 
paradigms with the force of deliberate resistance through thinking and doing desire 
differently. Desire configured within a heterosexual matrix affirms gender as oppositional. 
Subjectivity which is defined as an object rather than a series of acts is always defined not 
simply as what it is but through the value given it within social hierarchies. The power of 
situating certain positions within that hierarchy can be resisted through perversion. Perverse 
acts challenge subjectivity as spatially fixed, thus the capacity to fix the subject within a 
larger social hierarchy becomes difficult. This also challenges the notion that the value of 
certain subjects is always undesirable because it is named as such by dominant discourse. 
Actively naming one’s project as perverse acknowledges that within all relations of power – 
here the power to name and value – there is the potential for resistance through changing the 
meaning and hence value of terms. More than just altering the meaning of ‘pervert’, temporal 
subjectivity elucidates the primary paradigm of the spatial fixing of terms which dominant 
discourse relies on in order to define and value those terms.   
 
Alterity and the Power of Discourse 
 
The noun ‘perversion’ is frequently taken as a means to making the noun ‘pervert’ rather than 
as a verb. Because bodies are seen as finished once they exhibit adult sexual drives, the 
rigidity of the term pervert is affirmed upon intervention from other discourses: medicine, 
psychoanalysis, genetics. Theorising the body as existing not purely as a spatial subject, but in 
time as a series of open reconfigurations and constant change suggests other ways of 
understanding the self and the subject as being in permanent flux. Normalised subjectivity is 
itself a constant re-enactment of the constellation of what one wants to be, believes oneself to 
be, and societal expectation. For this reason all subjects are open to the potential of perverting 
themselves and each other through act, the force of relation, and affect, but none are pervert in 
an ontologically static sense. To actively seek to pervert the predictable pattern of subjective 
enactment, here beginning with the paradigm of sexuality, is to challenge the enactment of 
subjectivity as necessarily a re-enactment, but a possible place for transgression.  
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Culture most often defines sexuality through the presence, absence and place of the penis. 
Feminine sexuality is, by its existence in relation to the isomorphic signifier of the phallus, 
perverse if it is independent of or configured differently against the phallus. Masturbation is 
often considered a substitute for ‘real’ sex, foreplay considered preclusion to the ‘real’ act, 
and lesbianism remains an enigma in terms of sexual representation. Woman, according to 
Luce Irigaray, is relegated  
 
the hole, the lack, the ‘fault’, the castration that greets the little girl as she enters as a 
subject into representative systems. This is the indispensable assumption governing 
her appearance on the scene of ‘presence’, where neither her libido nor her sex/organs 
have any right to ‘truth’ except the truth that casts her as ‘less than’, other side, back 
side, of the representation thereby perpetuated. (Irigaray 83)  
 
Woman’s flesh can act as metaphor for discursive holes in representations of perversion. This 
metaphor is ambiguous however. The discursive hole as absence of representation or 
independent desire is also the hermeneutic hole in which woman is enclosed and named as 
other. The hole is empty and yet terminates the need to think woman further by relegating and 
defining lack of representation to representation of other as unknown or enigmatic. The 
enigma itself becomes the representation rather than signifier of something yet to be 
represented. Her genitals, defined as holes, and labial ‘fault’ lines, are not empty spaces but 
spaces empty only in reference to sexuality defined through phallic sexuality. Both woman 
and perversion are ‘less-than’ or ‘the other side’ of the neutral sexual (male hetero) subject. 
Both constitute a lack or hole in sexual discourse. Thinking this hole refuses it as being 
defined as absence alone. Exploring this place creates a volitional tactic of positive 
perversion, rather than an externally enforced definition or lack of definition. This hole 
becomes, literally, an entrance point for feminists and all minorities interested to challenge 
ways in which discourse constitutes gender and pleasure. 
 
Similar to the idea that for something to be feminist, it must be ‘different’ to culture’s 
dominant homogenised and homogenising structure, perversion is something different; 
reading a different way, comprehending a different way, and also, rendering the subject as 
different with each affect. It would be unethical to use perversion tactically without 
acknowledging issues of power, control and oppression in relation to sexuality clinically or 
socially defined as perverse. Power as mentioned earlier, resides in the power to name, and to 
define that name through its value and place in striated society. The power of discourse both 
constitutes bodies and desires and reflects their position in relation to the dominant. However, 
resistance does not need to oppose the dominant with one alternative. Perversion does not 
define itself, it simply resists the discursive power of the dominant to denigrate it. This project 
reflects the resistance feminism has expressed toward dominant patriarchal culture. Feminism 
is constituted as a political continuum rather than a static methodology, and feminist subjects 
are not a certain kind of subject, rather multiple subjects who resist the dominant as a refusal 
to being discursively ‘known’ or adamantly denied recognition. This seeming contradiction of 
refusing recognition but not wishing to be recognised as anything confuses binaries of 
presence/absence and knowledge/silence. Like feminism, perversion exploits such 
ambivalences and ambiguities, highlighting the anxiety any form of ambiguity arouses in 
projects of power which involve naming, knowing and valuing. 
 
The histories of various ‘perverse’ subjects locate them as objects of scientific research, their 
status of abnormal sexuality given them by scientific and social ontology. By making 
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perversion a tactic of becoming otherwise - a line of flight from established sexual paradigms 
- those bodies, and all bodies, claim the power to enact and define their own perversion. 
Perversion is an ethical tactic towards transformation as much as it is a subversive one, 
because it refutes the desirability of being accepted within dominant discourse, without 
refuting its own history or forgetting the accountability of the dominant. Becoming 
minoritarian does not know its own end; it does not become fixated with the rigid 
romanticism of marginals within a social system. Deleuze explains the difference between 
becoming pervert and romanticising marginality. He states,  
 
I share Michel’s [Foucault’s] distaste for those who consider themselves marginals; 
the romanticism of madness, delinquency, perversion, and drugs is less bearable for 
me. But for me lines of flight… are not created by marginals. On the contrary, they are 
objective lines that cut across a society, and on which marginals install themselves 
here and there in order to create a buckle, a whirl, a recoding. (Deleuze 189) 
 
Deleuze emphasises perversion is not an aim or a final product of subversion. In this article 
perversion refers to a tactic, not a subjective mode of existence. To pervert one’s static self is 
the aim, not to become pervert. Perversion is found in the way a subject functions rather than 
what a subject is. Perversion describes the open circuit of the flow of desire (existence as 
desire not with desire). This is contrary to desire defined through lack which demands object 
choice. Perversion thinks existence as a series of processes rather than a spatial position (a or 
the subject, available for clinicians as an object).  
 
Becoming is an aspiration for change in thinking the material self. Becoming deterritorialises 
subjectivity, mobilising rather than reifying the way we think self. The familiar territory of 
subjectivity resonates with sexual territory but more importantly with the familiar territory of 
how we think our subjectivity. Deterritorialising subjectivity embraces the risks and powers 
of leaving familiar territories of thought and act. Becoming has a lot in common with my use 
of the term pervert because both are a setting off of the subject without a final aim (but with 
an idea toward what one becomes, which in turn insinuates that from which one is perverted). 
However, it is also more than thinking the self through what the subject does rather than is. 
Acting is not performed in order to achieve attainable goals. Becoming is thinking the 
enacting body through the connections it makes which reassemble it. Traditional sexuality is 
defined by object choice – same object = homosexual, different object = heterosexual. This 
demands that the primary subject/object terms are immobilised in order to define them in 
proximity to one another. But sexuality is defined through the relation of movement 
(intensities, transformations, affects) between subject and act, and the affects produced from 
this relationship. Deleuze and Guattari state that “natural history can think only in terms of 
relationships (between a and b) not in terms of production (from A to x)” (234) and that 
“perception will no longer reside in the relation between a subject and an object, but rather in 
the movement serving as the limit of that relation in the period associated with that subject 
and object” (282). Hence utilising a perverse object or act to become otherwise is not about 
the essential perversion of object or act but the limits the relationship pushes. Perversion 
cannot be subsumed under prescriptions of ‘how to be perverse’. Perverse sexuality can be 
found in the quietest onanistic moment or during intercourse as much as outrageous acts or 
objects. Perversion is found in how the constellation of sexuality, desire and the flesh are 
thought, not the way this constellation fits into established sexual definitions and meanings. 
Perversion is contingent on the extent to which limits of paradigms of affect, subjectivity and 
power are renegotiated.  
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Feminist Transformations  
 
Becoming resonates around the multiplicity of proximities that effectuate and transform any 
individual at any point in existence. Becoming is not a metaphor of being or thinking 
differently, it is not a linear activity whereby one simply turns into an identifiable something 
else. Deleuze and Guattari assert that “becoming is certainly not imitating or identifying with 
something; neither is it regressing nor progressing… becoming is a verb with a consistency all 
its own; it does not reduce to, or lead back to, ‘appearing’, ‘being’, ‘equalling’” (238-239). 
Elizabeth Grosz discusses the points of contention and the points of usefulness where 
feminism intersects with Deleuzio-Guattarian thought. Grosz advocates Deleuze and 
Guattari’s explication of desire because it departs so violently from the traditional 
psychoanalytic definition of lack or idealisation of the Other as a motivation for desire. Grosz, 
following on from Deleuze and Guattari and Spinoza, posits desire differently, 
 
Instead of understanding desire as a lack or a hole in being, desire is understood by 
Deleuze - again following Spinoza and Nietzsche - as immanent, as positive and 
productive, a fundamental, full and creative relation. (Grosz A Thousand Tiny Sexes 
195) 
 
Grosz goes on to quote Colin Gordon as saying “desire is a relation of effectuation, not of 
satisfaction” (Grosz A Thousand 195). Rather than a body affected by desire, desire is 
effectuated through the flesh. Desire roams about the flesh, reorganising the stratification of 
the hermeneutic body. Grosz quotes Deleuze and Parnet to further her insistence that the body 
is to be  
 
analysed and assessed more in terms of what it can do, the things it can perform, the 
linkages it establishes, the transformations it undergoes, (my italics) the machinic 
connections it forms with other bodies, what it can link with, and how it can 
proliferate its capacities - a rare affirmative understanding of the body: (quotes 
Deleuze and Parnet) ‘Spinoza’s question: what is a body capable of? What affects is it 
capable of? Affects are becomings’… (Grosz Space, Time and Perversion 74) 
 
Rosi Braidotti makes an important distinction between Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming and 
the Bataillian concept of figuring desire as a radical change hence sacrifice of the subject. She 
states  
 
Deleuze’s becoming is rather the humble apprenticeship to not being anything/where 
more/other than what one is capable of sustaining and tolerating. It is life on the edge, 
but not over it; [or against its perpetuation, as Deleuze and Guattari point out in their 
discussion of becoming in the drug-addicted or suicidal mode] it is excessive but not 
in the sacrificial sense (exit Bataille). (Braidotti Meta(l)morphoses 68, my parenthesis)  
 
Because my discussion of perversion privileges its capacity to transform the subject, notions 
of an integrated subject are challenged. Through the destabilising effects of pleasure and 
perversion subjectivity shifts away from being defined through what it is (key to integration is 
the notion the borders and boundaries of the integrated self remain intact) and is more 
appropriately addressed through what it does and what is done to it. Choosing to use the body 
differently not only welcomes the transformations of pleasure and perversion but also 
acknowledges the instability of the integrity of the subject. Through challenging integrity 
perversion asks why integrity is such a mandatory quality of subjectivity. Transgression can 
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suggest the assertion that post-rupture will be followed by nothing (complete annihilation or 
sacrifice) or by a return of integrity, the subject changed but intact. What I think Deleuze and 
Guattari wish to emphasise is that becoming is about a different form/kind/articulation and 
species of subject. Nothing is killed off in favour of non-existence. (Deleuze and Guattari 
specifically point out that the becoming-annihilation is almost antithetical to the reasons why 
becoming is good for you.) In becoming there is no death, it is “life on the edge”, but with the 
emphasis on life, not edge. Deleuze and Guattari emphasise the temporal subject becoming in 
time (‘life’) rather than the annihilative spatial subject in the location of annihilation (‘edge’, 
also Deleuze and Guattari stating it is not movement - neither regressing nor progressing). 
 
No matter what the deterritorialising affect of perversion, if reterritorialisation – the 
reestablishment of a subject as fixed – is the aim, perversion is not a line of flight but a 
reaffirmation of acceptable axes of society. Subjectivity conventionally reiterates itself as 
stable. Even perverse subjects risk using perverse acts to signal their being pervert, thus 
although they deterritorialise from traditional sexual positions, wishing to belong to a new 
territory reterritorialises the subject. The subject may be different from others, but it is 
different in a fixed way. Because pleasure deterritorialises us, alters us from the moment 
before, the object we choose to be involved with during that change (the object of desire, or of 
sexual or any other interaction) is often used to assure continuity of our being when, after the 
pleasure has ceased and we ‘return’ to our known version of self, it is able to reaffirm who we 
are. The body-in-pleasure is repressed after the act, and the object choice is seen as the cause 
of pleasure. The cause of the pleasure is the body, is in the body and is experienced as the 
body. After a transformative affect has occurred, the object choice becomes stand-in for the 
body – ‘S/he caused me pleasure’ rather than ‘my body was/is pleasure’. So, even to utilise a 
perverse object choice as the only subversive element in a theorisation of different bodies 
limits the presence of corporeality implicit in and extricable from immanent self. 
 
The body is itself more potential than articulate-able. There are more things a body can do 
than we can ever suggest, and certainly more than we are able to linguistically describe. 
Beyond this is what culture sees the body as able (and sanctioned) to do. Grosz states: “There 
is an instability at the very heart of sex and bodies, the fact that the body is what it is capable 
of doing, and what any body is capable of doing is well beyond the tolerance of any given 
culture” (Grosz 214). The body is capable of doing much more than it is theorised as capable 
of, in medicine, in cultural and sexual theory, in all discursive fields. Deleuze and Guattari 
emphasise how one can tactically define the sexual body: “We know nothing about a body 
until we know what it can do, in other words, what its affects are, how they can or cannot 
enter into composition with other affects…” (257). They are not asking the body to perform 
super-human feats of transformation but only to attempt an encroachment on the limits of the 
body to push the body further out into its potentials. This means pushing the body away from 
being defined through correspondence with established ideas of what our subjectivity 
is/means/does. When thinking the body through the relations it makes the body itself must be 
continually defined otherwise. We do not need to become extraordinary monsters to become. 
Only to traverse, rearrange, exceed and decrease the rigid limits culture allows us to exist 
within and as our bodies. That is all, but at the same time that is mind-blowing enough. 
Becoming is harnessing the instability of the body, so whatever causes instability could be a 
useful moment of entry into becoming. Desire causes instability. Perversion destabilises the 
social mores that help check the instability implicit in desire. These suggestions have many 
problems, not the least of which is the fear that privileging the experiencing of one’s own 
body in new and different ways is another form of limit and not entirely estranged from 
biological essentialism. This is neither clearly bad nor good as yet, but it highlights 
 8
boundaries and limits which themselves are against the point of becoming as limit-less and 
boundary free.  
 
Monsters 
 
I have already pointed out that perverse desire is positive only in so far as it resists the 
formation of the noun ‘pervert’ adhering one form of perversion onto the subject as the being 
and essence of its desire. Here I will use the term monster to describe the perverse subject. 
From hysterical women to homosexuals, perversion has a strong relationship with the naming 
of social-sexual monsters. Perversion can be described as monstrous sexuality, hence those 
becoming-perverse clearly risk being named monsters. What is politically liberating, and what 
is risked, by embracing the monstrous?  
 
Braidotti defines monsters as: “human beings who are born with congenital malformations of 
their bodily organism. They also represent the in between, the mixed, the ambivalent as 
implied in the ancient Greek root of the word monsters, teras, which means both horrible and 
wonderful, object of aberration and adoration” (Braidotti Nomadic Subjects 77; my italics). 
Modern scientists, those who assist in the social naming of monsters, can themselves be seen 
as monsters in their determined drive to see further, pathologise more rigidly and adhere 
normality to the integrity of an organism, they are themselves enough of an object of wonder 
for Braidotti to include them in her argument. The Frankenstein story is reversed. Axes of 
wonder/horror is integral to monstrosity as a, if not the, primary site of ambiguity. At the 
primary level of monstrosity, the very first departure from the white integrated subject is the 
woman. In this way, any woman is a monster to begin with, and has been for as long as can be 
historically traced. A body of difference, while being (especially in a compulsory hetero 
normative culture) an object of fascination, is simultaneously that of disgust. Inherent in 
fascination for something is distance from it, so that if the monster is object of fascination or 
even desire, the fascinated must oppose rather than align himself or herself to the monster.  
 
The monster is that which abjectly pushes us outside symbolic integrity, either back, in 
psychoanalytic terms to the primary monster, the mother, or in a more Deleuzio-Guattarian 
sense that which pushes us away from what we think we are. In order to accept Braidotti’s 
suggestion to become monster we must desire monsters. One cannot want to become what 
one does not desire This kind of desire positions the self differently to heterosexual (i.e. 
implicitly oppositional) desire where one can only desire what is other to and othered from 
self. If we read desire as abundance, the desire for a monster changes both the subject desiring 
and the monster of desire. In a Lacanian frame, in order to desire a monster one cannot be 
monster. One is fulfilling the monstrous lack in the hitherto normal subject. That is why 
woman is the primary monster because man is the primary non-monster and desires only what 
he lacks. If we read desire for monstrosity without or after Lacan it is clear that there is less of 
an enforcement of otherness in the desire for monsters. The monster is not necessarily any 
longer the antithesis of self; rather monster simply becomes a category that wilfully refuses 
desire within a system of normal versus monster. To become monster is necessarily to begin 
at a point in repudiation of any anxiety about a loss through monstrosity (loss of subject, loss 
of power aligned with subjectivity). 
 
Vital in thinking monstrosity is to contextualise that if women are the first monsters, what do 
we lose by becoming (or embracing our already existent) monstrosity? Two problems arise 
here. The first is that by naming ourselves monsters women are in a way accepting the terms 
of their bodies given to them by phallologocentric culture.  It may be mimetic; it may be to 
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utilise phallologocentrism’s weapons against itself. But it is still affirming a condition for 
women (and all subsequent monsters) that was not chosen by women. The second problem is 
the glamorisation of conditions of subjugation in society. If glamorisation involves defining 
one position from another (dominant) position, the best of intentions risks reaffirming 
traditional discursive paradigms, both because it spatialises what the monster is, and invests a 
certain value in the definition. 
  
It is well to claim that becoming-monster is a positive way to radicalise the place to which the 
term monster commits such monsters. Gail Weiss takes Braidotti up on this by firmly planting 
her contrary arguments within the context of Braidotti’s anxieties about reproductive 
technology and the teratology – the formation of cultural or sexual ‘monsters’ as objects of 
ontological analysis – of genetically defined homosexuality and perversion. Desire is here not 
configured as dissipating the subject through which it ranges toward becoming-minoritarian, 
but “desire, which takes knowledge as its object” (Braidotti Nomadic Subjects 90). This risks 
being a desire that dissipates the subject into a reformulation, or reiteration, of majoritarian 
subjectivity. The formulation of a becoming body is not without negative implications, 
especially from a feminist perspective where a re-negotiation of subjectivity is occurring in 
post-structuralism before the subjectivity to be negotiated has been sanctioned for subjects of 
difference, such as women, non-white races and others. This flaw only emphasises the 
importance of feminist intervention in new ideas about being and becoming in order that post-
subjects, perverse subjects and other subjects of post-modern difference will be ethical as well 
as culturally transformative. What is transformed here are issues around a singular ability to 
define subjects (including one’s own ability as the only valid one) and subjects as defined 
only through what they are, which is both nostalgic of their history and establishes their future 
(spatialising subjects contracts the temporal aspect of subjectivity into a single moment). 
Seyla Benhabib defines ethics as interaction rather than legislation, and temporalised 
subjectivity demands continual interaction because a moving, changing entity cannot be 
defined and thus legislated against. Feminism’s interventions are not exchanges of one mode 
of thinking for another, but an interaction with the legislative thought that reifies subject 
positions.   
 
Weiss asks “is this mixture of horror and fascination advantageous for those who are its 
objects, that is, is this a mixture of passions we want to privilege?” (Weiss 108)  In order for 
old monsters to be replaced by new monsters there will always be a form of monstrosity 
devalued beyond all others. This makes the demand for ‘advantage’ impossible; for those 
advantaged others must be disadvantaged through their alterity. Weiss’ emphasis on ‘those’ 
rather than ‘we’ is telling. The call to become minoritarian through monstrosity first 
challenges primary differentiations between ‘we’ (non-monster) and ‘those’ (monsters). 
Becoming-monster is a challenge to the bifurcation between monster and not-monster, and the 
discursive act of defining these separately not to the definition of monster. 
 
But then, what exactly constitutes a ‘real’ monster that appropriating the term monster will 
harm and make light its pain? Are not women already monster enough that to call themselves 
the new monsters will constitute an ownership of the derogatory term given them? What 
would Weiss define as a real monster? Is the act of defining an incitement to the reification of 
another ‘other’ or type of minoritarian subject? Both Jennifer Terry and Rosi Braidotti state 
we are only monsters in reference to those who call us monsters. Braidotti juxtaposes the self-
proclaimed monsters, be they culturally evident as monsters, against the monsters technology 
creates and names precisely because monstrosity is devalued in terms of that who names the 
monster ‘monsters’. The political nature of monsters seems to come directly from the acts of 
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naming and defining (and the reasons for the acts), not the nature of the object named. There 
is no essential non-contingent thing named monster. Weiss discusses the use of the word 
monster as metaphor and the way in which metaphor devalues the meaning of terms. Monster 
then loses its necessary subversive potential. I do not think Braidotti is advocating using 
‘monster’ as metaphor. I think she means it as a literal becoming, in the same way Deleuze 
and Guattari do not want us to act ‘like’ in becoming.  
 
All acts of naming, metaphoric or not, have the capacity to compel the corporeal performance 
of the name given, so even metaphor is not incapable of material effect. Sexuality, corporeal 
de- and mal-formations, skin colour, female and hermaphroditic genitals and even tattoos and 
piercings are all material conditions of the human body that are far more than metaphor both 
in their inability to be cast off and also their definition within culture. They also somewhat 
resist any singular definition of subjectivity, reflecting the ‘holes’ of discourse enclosed 
simply as ‘other’ which I discussed above in relation to Irigaray. If they were metaphor 
experienced suffering and real triumph would be irrelevant when thinking monstrosity. Weiss 
asks “does this fascination and horror in Braidotti’s corresponding reification of these 
passions, serve to intensify, in oppressive ways, the monstrosity of the monstrous? (Weiss 
108) She emphasises the intensification of the term monster through the passions of 
fascination and horror. By intensification I think she means some form of othering, the thing 
we call monster and the desire for it. This intensification is not of visibility or equality but 
precisely of discourse. Monsters ‘appear’ only when discourse about them appears, which is 
why discourse and speech are as urgent issues as the bodies and acts of those addressed.  If 
Braidotti is advocating a becoming-monster, or a proclamation of monster then the first desire 
we must have for monsters is for our own ‘monster-isation’, claiming (or stealing) the 
immanent discourse that threatens to define and other us. Weiss’ point is an important and 
valid one which comes from the anxiety I think Braidotti exhibits herself in her theorisation of 
monsters, that becoming monster is fraught with the threat of being named monster by 
someone else in the wrong terms, as the wrong kind of monster within the wrong discursive 
episteme. But what becoming monster does successfully achieve is the emphatic refusal of 
phallologocentricism’s categories and boundaries that have been set up for monsters, semi-
monsters and the rare normal subject. Braidotti emphasises that “we need to learn to think of 
the anomalous, the monstrously different not as a sign of pejoration but as the unfolding of 
virtual possibilities that point to positive alternatives for us all” (Teratologies 172). The 
virtual here refers to the instability in thinking possibility without establishing a limited and 
limiting series of pre-set possibilities. Braidotti’s explicit refusal of ‘the sign’ is a refusal of 
signification within systems of knowledge and discourse. Even monsters as signs of 
celebration use signification as a stabilising act, rather than the infinite potential of thinking 
the monster as continual ‘unfolding’.   
 
There is, it seems, no ‘safe’ concept of monster that does not threaten to slide back into more 
traditional exercises of naming as power. Discourse reifies through analysis and affirmation of 
(hierarchical) place, of function, form and nature. Monsters challenge all of these categories 
by being both resistant to and ambiguous within them. Whatever the joys of becoming-
monster, the risks are great, both towards our expectations of what becoming-monster will 
mean in a ‘real’ sociological context and also the risks we take by appropriating a concept 
that, like woman, is dangerously linked with degrading and power-embedded practices. The 
seeming contradiction in becoming something that by its very nature, cannot be described as 
any one ‘thing’ enhances the risks. This reflects a similar argument that Braidotti, among 
other feminists, poses to Deleuze and Guattari’s theories of becoming as always having to 
first become-woman. There is, perhaps, an issue with two white men advocating “becoming-
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woman as atoms of womanhood capable of crossing and impregnating an entire social field, 
and of contaminating men, of sweeping them up in that becoming” (276). In the same way 
that to become-monster means an appropriation of the lives of ‘monsters’ which reduces the 
pain of being monster to a momentary transition in order to be subversive or transformative, 
Deleuze and Guattari have been accused of reducing and ignoring the material lived reality of 
women in posing a becoming-woman as a transitory practice towards becoming a presumably 
better something-else. Also that woman, like monster, is a level easier to attain than higher 
levels of subjectivity, any man can ‘become-woman’ but no woman can become a man, 
“because man is majoritarian par excellence, whereas becoming are minoritarian” (291). A 
conundrum occurs when the minoritarian is denied access to majoritarian social power, 
including the power to negotiate and formulate discourse, while men are becoming-women, 
potentially ablating this denial of access. Deleuze and Guattari’s urgent ethical devaluation of 
majoritarianism however, remains convincingly resonant in addressing trajectories of active 
divergence and rehabituation from majoritarianism beyond the hermeneutics of immobile 
subjectivity. 
 
To become monster implies something to lose by becoming monster (in the same way that 
becoming-woman is something to lose for man). But what is lost? How valuable is it? Within 
a Deleuzio-Guattarian frame what is lost in becoming is that which anchors the subject 
indefinitely to the very world from which becoming is a line of flight. Wanting to become is 
in this instance desiring and exploiting the excesses of that which culture values. They state 
“there is no subject of the becoming except as deterritorialised variable of the majority” (292). 
Thus the parameters of majoritarianism are affected by becoming-minoritarian and 
possibilities of becoming-minoritarian shift through alterations in axes of majoritarianism. 
The restraint culture imposes on normal subjectivity is the very thing becoming disavows. By 
shedding these restraints, or ‘taking flight’ from them, becoming expresses a deep suspicion 
of them. Someone who wants to become monster could already be seen to disavow the system 
that has pushed monster outside of normal subjectivity. Becoming here is a means to get 
‘outside’, which is perhaps what Deleuze and Guattari meant in their insistence of becoming-
woman. Monster and woman are specific groups but intersectional specific groups that refuse, 
or are denied, discourse to a certain extent, in opposition to the definition of, and defining by 
man. The terms themselves are ambivalence, in the same way as Braidotti’s passions of 
wonder and horror are ambivalence. Normal subjectivity is not ambivalence nor ambivalent, 
and its very existence is through its separation from everything it is not. The compulsion to 
name is a compulsion to know, and ambivalence excavates the endless nature of knowledge 
rather than focussing on what is known. It is difficult to vindicate silencing those who have 
yet to speak. This could suggest that, at worst, feminism is just another discourse. However, 
as feminists know, each discourse of feminism is a multiple proliferation of a variety of 
discourses. Most of these aim to open discussion, investigating the gaps and holes in the 
discourse of ‘humanity’, essentially ‘manity’ or more correctly ‘majoritanity’. Monster theory 
may be a silencing of monster defined through dominant discourse, and, like perversion, as 
fluid and temporal, should acknowledge the silences or unspoken within all speech, or the 
desire to not speak as a refusal to define.  
 
Toward Feminist Becomings 
 
All becoming is becoming monster; even the desire to want to become is monstrous, because 
all becoming is about becoming an ambiguity between, but never attaining either of, two 
points. Becoming is about negotiating the discursive constitution of bodily limitations seen in 
the stratified, signified body, the values attached to those significations and the sources of the 
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constituting discourses. Discourse is corporeal because we are enfleshed versions of the 
speech that constitutes us from culture without and from self-regulation or identification 
within. We can, of course, only live the body to which we have access. In order for there to 
ever be a potential for actual becoming, the potential of the body we are now must be 
recognised. Our bodies present enough of a potential for change and transformation. The 
limitations our cultural and biological body represents, the so-called already perfect subject 
body, or scientifically described and hence ‘finished’ body, is a body that is experienced or 
lived through being discursively situated. The body as a material discourse or discursive 
materiality, is a site where flesh and speech or knowledge fold within and through each other 
as an expression of self. The body as continuum is important as the primary vehicle to change 
and of change, and desire as the current through which the body is regulated and transformed 
is an essential aspect of thinking this vehicle. For feminism, desire is problematic as having 
been either denied or annexed to masculine desire, and thus it is a key axis by which to 
rethink the body, also victim to this lack or annexation. From here the potential is limitless. 
The line of flight does not fly off into the distance but rather flies inside our own bodies in 
transformation and redistribution of fleshly intensities, spatially static we fly from what we 
were before and become something otherwise.  
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